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A Statistical Look at Roger Clemens’ Pitching Career
Abstract
A recent report (Hendricks Sports Management, LP, et al, 2008) issued by Hendricks Sports Management,
LP, claims to provide evidence for the lack of use of performance-enhancing substances (PESs) by Hall-of-
Fame caliber pitcher Roger Clemens, a claim based on an analysis of his career statistics (using ERA = earned
run average, K rate = strikeout rate, innings pitched), both in isolation and in comparison to other power
pitchers of his era (Randy Johnson, Nolan Ryan, and Curt Schilling).
In this research, we re-examine Roger Clemens’ career using a more complete and stable set of pitching
measures (WHIP = walks + hits per inning pitched, BAA = batting average against, ERA, BB rate = rate of
walks per batter faced, K rate), and by using a broader (census) comparison set of pitchers with similar
longevity in order to reduce the selection bias inherent in the Hendricks report. In contrast to Hendricks’
report, our analysis examines not only late career performance but also early- and mid-career trends. Our
findings can be summarized as follows:
Using simple quadratic functions, and an occasional spline to relate the above pitching measures to age, we
demonstrate a number of empirical regularities:
• Roger Clemens’ career is atypical with respect to his peer group. While most pitchers with comparable
longevity improve for the first half of their career, peaking just past the age of 30 and then declining (an
inverted-U shape), Roger Clemens’ career statistics shows a decrease into his early thirties followed by
a marked improvement late in his career (more of a U-shape).
• This pattern is consistent across most measures for Roger Clemens, yet for certain measures is not
unique to him. That is, other pitchers have atypical patterns as well for some, but not all other tested
measures.
Our analyses suggest what we, as statisticians, have postulated all along: empirical association is not causation,
and neither the Hendricks report nor ours can prove or disprove the use of PESs by any given player. This is
because players are indeed unique, and due to the short-time series and sparseness of comparable players
there is low power to assess specific hypotheses. However, our analyses clearly suggest that Roger Clemens’
career pitching trajectory is atypical.
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A recent report (Hendricks Sports Management, LP, et al, 2008) issued by 
Hendricks Sports Management, LP, claims to provide evidence for the lack of use of 
performance-enhancing substances (PESs) by Hall-of-Fame caliber pitcher Roger 
Clemens, a claim based on an analysis of his career statistics (using ERA = earned run 
average, K rate = strikeout rate, innings pitched), both in isolation and in comparison to 
other power pitchers of his era (Randy Johnson, Nolan Ryan, and Curt Schilling).   
 
In this research, we re-examine Roger Clemens’ career using a more complete 
and stable set of pitching measures (WHIP = walks + hits per inning pitched, BAA = 
batting average against, ERA, BB rate = rate of walks per batter faced, K rate), and by 
using a broader (census) comparison set of pitchers with similar longevity in order to 
reduce the selection bias inherent in the Hendricks report.  In contrast to Hendricks’ 
report, our analysis examines not only late career performance but also early- and mid- 
career trends. Our findings can be summarized as follows: 
 
Using simple quadratic functions, and an occasional spline to relate the above 
pitching measures to age, we demonstrate a number of empirical regularities: 
 
• Roger Clemens’ career is atypical with respect to his peer group.  While 
most pitchers with comparable longevity improve for the first half of 
their career, peaking just past the age of 30 and then declining (an 
inverted-U shape), Roger Clemens’ career statistics shows a decrease 
into his early thirties followed by a marked improvement late in his 
career (more of a U-shape). 
 
• This pattern is consistent across most measures for Roger Clemens, yet 
for certain measures is not unique to him.  That is, other pitchers have 
atypical patterns as well for some, but not all other tested measures. 
 
Our analyses suggest what we, as statisticians, have postulated all along: 
empirical association is not causation, and neither the Hendricks report nor ours can 
prove or disprove the use of PESs by any given player.  This is because players are 
indeed unique, and due to the short-time series and sparseness of comparable players 
there is low power to assess specific hypotheses.  However, our analyses clearly suggest 





Baseball is ‘America’s Pastime’ and with attendance and interest at an all-time 
high, it is clear that baseball is a big business.  Furthermore, many of the sport’s hallowed 
records (the yearly home run record, the total home run record, the 500 home run club, 
etc.) are being assailed and passed at a pace never before seen.  Yet, due to the admitted 
use and accusations documented in the “Mitchell report” (2007), of performance 
enhancing substances (PES’s), the “shadow” (Fainaru-Wada and Williams, 2007) over 
these accomplishments is receiving as much press, if not more, than the breaking of the 
records themselves.   
 
A particularly salient example comes from a recently released report by 
Hendricks Sports Management, LP (Hendricks Sports Management, LP, et al) which led 
to widespread national coverage.  This report purported to demonstrate the innocence 
from claims of PES use directed at Roger Clemens, one of baseball’s all-time highest-
performing pitchers.  Using well-established baseball statistics including ERA (number 
of earned runs allowed per nine innings pitched) and K-rate (strikeout rate per nine-
innings pitched), the report compares Roger Clemens’ career to those of other great 
power pitchers of his era (Randy Johnson, Nolan Ryan, and Curt Schilling) and proclaims 
that Roger Clemens’ career trajectory on these measures is not atypical.  Based on this 
finding, the report suggests that the pitching data themselves are not an indictment (nor 
does it provide proof) of Clemens guilt; in fact, just the opposite.  
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While we concur with the Hendricks report that a statistical analysis of Clemens’ 
career can provide prima facie ‘evidence’1, our approach provides a new look at his 
career pitching trajectory using a broader set of measures as well as a broader comparison 
set of pitchers.  This is important as there has been a lot of recent research as to what are 
the most reliable and stable measures of pitching performance (Albert, 2006) and our 
attempt is to be inclusive in this regard.  In Section 2, we provide a closer examination of 
Clemens’ career with respect to these additional pitching measures.   
 
 Even more importantly, one of the pitfalls that all analyses of extraordinary 
events (the immense success of Clemens as a pitcher) have is ‘right-tail self-selection’.  If 
one compares extraordinary players only to other extraordinary players, and selects that 
set of comparison players based on their behavior on that extraordinary dimension, then 
one does not obtain a representative (appropriate) comparison set.  By focusing only on 
pitchers who pitched effectively into their mid-forties, the Hendricks report minimized 
the possibility that Clemens would look atypical.  Here we use more reasonable criteria 
for pitchers that are based on their longevity and the number of innings pitched in their 
career to form the comparison set, rather than performance at any specific point in their 
career. 
 
The focus of this paper is an analysis of Clemens’ career using a more 
sophisticated and comprehensive database which we describe in Section 3. Section 4 
contains our analysis of this larger comparison set, which suggests that Roger Clemens’ 
                                                 
1 It is important to point out that neither the Hendricks report nor this one can prove or disprove the guilt or 
innocence of any player based on data alone.  Rather, statistics can provide a lens through which we can 
compare a focal player to other comparable sets of players. 
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performance is very atypical along these dimensions.  We conclude in Section 5 with a 
set of prescriptive advice for those who wish to perform similar analyses. 
2. A Closer Look at the Career of Roger Clemens 
Before we begin our full analysis and discussion, we first take a closer look at 
Clemens’ entire career. To be sure, this unavoidable act of data “snooping” was part of 
our research method, and it is instructive to unfold our insights in the order in which they 
actually occurred.  For the average fan, the most salient measures of success are winning 
percentage and ERA, which are a good place to start. 











What these graphs show is that Clemens quickly established himself as a star and in the 
early 1990s he lost his “relative” luster. His final 4 years with the Red Sox were 
certifiably mediocre (compared to his history), so much so that the future Hall of Famer 
was considered to be in the “twilight of his career” (Dan Duquette quoted in Silverman, 
1996). However, as our graph clearly demonstrates, Clemens recovered and climbed to 
new heights at the comparatively old age of 35. His last few years showed a second 
period of decline.  
Now any ‘well-read’ student of baseball understands that winning percentage and 
ERA (Earned Run Average) are fairly noisy measures of quality. Both measures are 
readily affected by factors outside a pitcher’s ability, such as fielding and the order in 
which batting events occur. Additionally, winning percentage depends critically on run 
support. Analysts who specialize in pitching evaluation, instead use measures of 
component events2, such as rates of Strike Outs (K) and Walks (BB). We graph the career 
trajectory of K rate and BB rate for Roger Clemens below: 





                                                 
2 For example, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baseball_statistics#Pitching_statistics.  
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Again we see Clemens’ strong start, a gradual decline in BB rate as he entered the “first-
twilight” of his career, followed by a marked improvement. His strikeout rate improved 
in his early career and then suddenly declined and then rose again peaking at age of 35 in 
1998 in his second year with Toronto.  
 
To put these career trajectories in an appropriate context, we require a comparison 
group. Our first effort (but not our last) was a handful of star-level contemporaries, 
including Greg Maddux, Randy Johnson and Curt Schilling, whose career trajectories on 
these statistics are graphed below: 













The career trajectories for all three of these star contemporaries of Clemens are nicely fit 
with quadratic curves. In terms of performance, the curves clearly show steady 
improvement as they entered their primes followed by a marked decline in their strikeout 
rate and a leveling off in their walk rates.  
 
The contrast with Clemens’ career trajectory is quite stark.  The second act for 
Clemens is unusual when compared to these other greats because his later success 
follows such an unprecedented period of decline. This leaves us with the following 




3. Database Construction 
 
In order to perform our statistical analyses, we first obtained data from the 
Lahman Database, Version 5.5 (www.baseball1.com) on all major league baseball 
pitchers, and their associated statistics, whose careers were contained in the years 1969-
2007.  The starting year of 1969 was selected because of the change in the height of the 
pitchers’ mound (Vescey, 1968), which launched the ‘modern era’ in baseball.  From that 
set of pitchers, we constructed a comparison set of all durable starting pitchers by looking 
at all pitchers who played at least 15 years (with 10 or more games started per year) and 
had at least 3000 innings pitched.3  There were thirty-one pitchers besides Roger Clemens 
that fit these criteria.  All of these starting pitchers therefore had comparably long careers 
(in years) and innings pitched similar to Roger Clemens, and hence were a relevant 
comparison set; albeit others could certainly be chosen.  Appendix 1 gives the names and 
a set of descriptive statistics for the 31 players and Clemens.  
 
For each of these pitchers, we looked at the following well-established pitching 
statistics for each of the years in which they pitched: 
 
[1] WHIP = Walks + Hits per inning pitched; 
[2] BAA = Batting average for hitters when facing the given pitcher; 
[3] ERA = Earned run average per nine innings pitched; 
[4] BB Rate = Walk rate; 
                                                 
3 Sensitivity analyses run that included minor perturbations in these criterion indicated that the results are 
quite stable. 
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[5] K rate = Batter strike out rate per plate appearance (not including walks) 
 
Together, these statistics provide a fairly complete picture of the career trajectory for a 
starting pitcher.  We describe next in Section 4 a set of analyses we performed on the 
data. 
 
4. Trajectory Analyses 
 
 In order to understand and summarize the trajectory that each of the five (j = 1, 
…J=5) aforementioned statistics take, for each of the thirty-two (i =1, .., I = 32) focal 
pitchers (including Clemens), we fit a quadratic function to each pitcher’s data at year t as 
follows: 
 
ijtitijitijijijt AgeAgeS εβββ +++= 2210    [1] 
 
where ijtS = value of statistic j for pitcher i in their t-th season, Ageit = age of pitcher i in 
their t-th major league season, ij0β , ij1β , and ij2β are an intercept and coefficients 
describing how Age and Age2 influence the prediction of the statistics, and ijtε is a 
randomly distributed normal error term.4 We acknowledge that a quadratic curve may not 
be the best model for every pitcher’s career, including Roger Clemens.  However, the 
                                                 
4 As none of these statistics were near boundaries, taking transformations to make the normal residual error 
more plausible had little impact. 
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quadratic curve is a simple model with interpretable coefficients that provide a common 
basis of comparison for all pitchers in our study. 
 
Our primary interest centers around the coefficient ij2β which describes whether the 
pitchers trajectory for that statistic is purely linear as they age ( ij2β = 0), “hump-shaped” 
( ij2β <0) or ”U-shaped” ( ij2β >0).  To provide some context around this, one might 
predict the following patterns, corresponding a priori to a pitcher hitting a mid-career 
“prime” and then falling off near the end of his career.   
 
[1] WHIP ( ij2β >0 and career peak = -β1ij/β2ij≈ 31 5).   
[2] BAA ( ij2β >0 and career peak = -β1ij/β2ij≈ 29) 
[3] ERA ( ij2β >0 and career peak = -β1ij/β2ij≈ 29) 
[4] BB Rate ( ij2β >0 and career peak = -β1ij/β2ij≈ 33) 
[5] K rate ( ij2β <0 and career low = -β1ij/β2ij≈  29). 
 
Note the sign change for K rate for ij2β as more strikeouts is better, while a lower value 
for the other statistics is better. Figures 6A and 6B below contain a more detailed analysis 
of the data from the Hendricks report, using ERA.  We first present in Figure 6a the ERA 
curves for the 32 relevant players (31 pitchers + Clemens).  Each individual trajectory is 
depicted with a gray curve, except for Clemens who has a red curve.  Also given is a 
black curve which is the quadratic trajectory fit to the data for all 31 players except 
                                                 
5 We report the empirically estimated values here out of interest. 
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Clemens.  Figure 6b contains the players with curves that have quadratic terms which are 
“atypical” ( ij2β ≤ 0) compared to the prior hypothesis of a mid-career prime. Six players, 
including Clemens, have these atypical curves, and in fact Clemens’ curve looks quite  
atypical even within this subset of six players 
 
Figure 6A Figure 6B 
 
 
Figures 7A and 7B below contain career trajectories of WHIP for the same 32 players. 
Roger Clemens is again within a small subset of seven pitchers that show atypical career 
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paths.  Further inspection of his WHIP curve suggests that he was the only pitcher to get 
worse as his career went on and then improve at the end of his career.   
Figure 7A Figure 7B 
 
 
Two additional analyses we performed using ERA and WHIP were to compute 
the same figures as Figures 6 and 7, but instead using ERA margin and WHIP margin, 
defined as the difference between the individual ERA and the league average. In 
Appendix 2, we show the ERA margin and WHIP margin curves for Roger Clemens and 
for the average over the 31 other pitchers, and we see little difference between the raw 
curves (Figures 6 and 7) and the margin curves. 
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Figures 8A and 8B below contain career trajectories of BB rate (Walks per Batter 
Faced) for the same 32 players. For BB rate, we note that there are 10 pitchers who have 
‘inverted-U’ fits to their data with Clemens being one of them.  Furthermore, the 
“steepness” of his improvement is particularly noticeable in the later years, even amongst 
this set of 10. 
Figure 8A                                  Figure 8B 
 
There are several pitching measures for which Clemens’ career trajectory does not 
look atypical, which is the central assertion of the Hendricks report.  In Figures 9A and 
9B below, we give the strikeout rate (K per non-BB batters faced) for each of the 32 
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durable starting pitchers.  Clemens does have an overall higher K rate than most pitchers 
in this set, but his career trajectory follows a similar shape ( ij2β <0) to 24 of the other 31 
players at least with respect to the quadratic fit.   
Figure 9A Figure 9B 
 
 
In Figures 10A and 10B below, we examine BAA (Batting Average Against) for 
each of the 32 pitchers.  Similar to K rate, we again observe that Clemens has a typical 
shape to his career trajectory to most (24 out of 31) of these other starting pitchers, albeit 






Figure 10A Figure 10B 
 
5. Summary Conclusions 
 
Through the use of simple exploratory curve fitting applied to a number of 
pitching statistics, and for a well-defined set of long-career pitchers, we assessed whether 
Roger Clemens pitching trajectories were atypical.  Our evidence is suggestive that while 
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most long-term pitchers have peaked mid-career and decline thereafter, Roger Clemens 
(for some key statistics) worsened mid-career and improved thereafter.   
 
So, what can we conclude?  We can conclude that his pitching career was 
statistically atypical for long-term pitchers in terms of WHIP, BB rate and ERA, and in 
particular, Clemens shows an end-of-career improvement that is rarely seen.  The data 
does not exonerate (nor indict) Roger Clemens, since an exploratory statistical analysis of 
this type never proves innocence or guilt.  After analyzing this data set there are at least 
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Appendix 1: Durable Starting Pitchers (1968-2007) 
Name  
Number of 
Years First Year Last Year Innings Pitched 
Doyle Alexander 18 1971 1989 3261 
Vida Blue 15 1971 1986 3263 
Bert Blyleven 21 1970 1992 4950 
Kevin Brown 17 1989 2005 3228 
Steve Carlton 20 1968 1987 4938 
Roger Clemens 24 1984 2007 4917 
Chuck Finley 15 1988 2002 3060 
Tom Glavine 20 1988 2007 4300 
Orel Hershiser 15 1984 1999 3072 
Fergie Jenkins 16 1968 1983 4015 
Randy Johnson 18 1989 2007 3768 
Tommy John 21 1968 1989 4011 
Jerry Koosman 18 1968 1985 3817 
Greg Maddux 21 1987 2007 4783 
Denis Martinez 20 1977 1996 3832 
Jack Morris  16 1979 1994 3672 
Jamie Moyer 20 1986 2007 3519 
Mike Mussina 17 1991 2007 3362 
Joe Niekro 16 1968 1987 3201 
Phil Neikro 20 1968 1987 5057 
Jim Palmer 15 1969 1983 3581 
Gaylord Perry 16 1968 1983 4281 
Rick Reuschel 17 1972 1990 3517 
Jerry Ruess 20 1970 1989 3655 
Nolan Ryan 26 1968 1993 5383 
Curt Schilling 16 1992 2007 3116 
Tom Seaver 19 1968 1986 4532 
John Smoltz 15 1988 2007 3082 
Don Sutton 21 1968 1988 4824 
Frank Tanana 20 1974 1993 4162 
Bob Welch 16 1978 1993 3023 
David Wells 18 1990 2007 3259 
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Appendix 2: ERA and WHIP Margin Curves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
